











Abstract The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act of 1976 greatly broadened the scope of U.S. fishery
regulation. While the act contained a variety of features, its pri-
mary and certainly most controversial provision expanded the re-
gulated fishing zone from 12 to 200 miles. This paper identifies
the primary gainers and losers from the act and assesses their
roles in influencing the legislative outcome. The voting behavior
of congressional representatives is analyzed by multivariate probit
analysis in order to quantify the influences of the major lobbying
groups.
Introduction
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(FCMA) greatly broadened the scope of U.S. fishery regulation.
While the act contained a variety of features, its primary and
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certainly most controversial provision expanded the regulated fish-
ing zone from 12 to 200 miles.^ Within the new zone, the U.S.
claimed exclusive rights to all fish except highly migratory species
such as tuna. Beyond the zone, exclusive rights were also claimed
for anadromous species (e.g., salmon) that spawned in U.S. waters.
The act prohibited foreign vessels from fishing in the zone unless
they carried a valid permit, allocated at the discretion of the secre-
tary of state and issued by the secretary of commerce.
This rather dramatic change in operating rights in fishing was
preceded by a considerable amount of congressional debate. Pro-
ponents argued that excessive fishing within the 200-mile zone had
endangered many species. Opponents noted that unilateral action
by the U.S. risked international discord and that a multilateral
agreement reached by negotiation at, for example, the Law of the
Sea Conference, would be preferable. It also became quite evident
that the costs and benefits of the act were not uniformly dispersed
among U.S. fishing interests. Major segments of the U.S. fisheries
industry opposed the legislation.
This paper seeks to identify the primary gainers and losers from
FCMA and to assess their roles in influencing the legislative out-
come. First, the major interest groups are identified and their
respective positions of FCMA are reviewed. Next, the voting be-
havior of congressional representatives is subjected to a multi-
variate probit analysis to test hypotheses concerning the factors
that govern the political influence of special interest groups.
Prospective Gainers and Losers
For U.S. fishing interests whose activities are concentrated within
the 200-mile zone and the anadromous species harvesters, FCMA
was perceived much like a cash subsidy. To the extent that foreign
fishing would be reduced in the zone, the existing fish stocks avail-
able for U.S. harvesters would, at least temporarily, be increased.
Catch per unit of effort would be expected to increase and, con-
sequently, average cost (per fish) would decrease.
However, some U.S. fishing interests cast their nets beyond the
200-mile zone and were potential losers from the legislation. Firms
involved in distant shrimping or tuna fishing feared retaliatory re-Expansion of Fishery Jurisdiction 145
strietions by foreign nations. The division within the U.S. fishing
industry did not escape notice by Congress. Representative Patsy
Mink of Hawaii recounted the opposition to the legislation from
her state's largest processing firm. Bumble Bee Seafoods: "While it
[Bumble Bee] stood to gain some in the area of salmon fishing, it
stood to lose a great deal in its shrimp and tuna operation" (U.S.
Congress, 1975).
Recreational fishing interests also had a stake in the legislation.
If the law curbed aggregate (foreign plus domestic) commercial
fishing in the U.S. zone, recreational fishing would likely improve.
Consumers could be expected to be affected by the legislation also.
If expanding the fishing zones did indeed reduce the aggregate
harvest, world prices would rise in the short run {ceteris paribus).
However, if this ensured larger stocks for future harvests, fish prices
would be lower over the longer run. The net desirability to con-
sumers of higher short-run but lower long-run prices depends upon
the magnitude of the price changes and consumer discount rates.
In any event, the interests of the consumers were conspicuously
absent from congressional debate, with discussion focusing on the
"unfair" harvesting practices of modern foreign fleets and the sad
plight of the U.S. fishing industry.
Congressional Voting Behavior
The Model
This section of the paper investigates the voting behavior of sena-
tors and representatives on FCMA in order to assess the pohtical
influence of the various special interest groups. The economic
theory of representative voting assumes that legislators are vote
maximizers who seek optimal trade-offs in apportioning political
support between groups (or individuals) in society.^ Support given
to any one group provides costs and benefits to the legislator. The
favored group can be expected to provide votes, contributions, and
donated labor services. The group that is disfavored by the legis-
lator is likely to transfer support to an opposing candidate.
The existence of transactions and information costs and the
free-rider problem apparently give relatively small but intensely
interested groups a comparative advantage in the marketplace for146 Burton A. Abrams
political influetice. This has led Stigler (1971, p. 3) to argue that
"as a rule, regulatioti is acquired by the itidustry atid is designed
and operated for its benefit." It follows that large and casually inter-
ested groups would tend to be the victims of regulation.
FCMA posed a dilemma for many legislators. As noted earlier,
tuna and shrimp interests opposed the legislation while coastal and
salmon interests favored the bill. Many legislators from coastal
states found both of these opposing groups located in their own
states. Thus the primary competitors over the legislation were
equally well-organized industries. Economic voting theory would
predict that legislators would perform a rational calculation (or act
as if they did) to decide which group's loyalty had the highest net
worth. Larger and less well-organized groups such as recreational
fishermen would be expected to have a smaller influence upon the
legislator's voting decision.
For the empirical analysis the final roll call votes on HR 200 and
S961 were subjected to a multivariate probit analysis. The model
that was estimated took the following form:
SFCMA; = /(party,-, ADA,, tuna;, shrimp,, salmon,, coastal;, PCPI;)
where
SFCMA; = legislator i's position on FCMA
(1 = support, 0 = opposition); data from
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1977);
party; = the party affiliation of legislator i
(1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican); data from
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1977);
ADA; = the rating given to legislator i by the Americans
for Democratic Action; data from ADA Newsletter
(1977);
tuna; = the dollar amount of tuna landed in legislator f s
state divided by state fs total personal income; data for
tuna, shrimp, salmon, and coastal are from U.S.
Department of Commerce (1978) and U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1977);
shrimp; = the dollar amount of shrimp landed in legislator
fs state, divided by state fs total personal income;Expansion of Fishery Jurisdiction 147
salmoti; = the dollar atnount of salmon landed in legislator
i's state divided by state i's total personal incotne;
coastal; = the dollar amount of coastal fish and shellfish landed in
legislator i's state divided by state i's total personal
income;
PCPI, = state i's personal income per capita; data from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1977).
The executive branch and the secretary of state opposed FCMA
because they favored a multilateral solution and were concerned
that freedom of the high seas would be undermined. The party
variable was designed to capture the effects of voting out of party
loyalty to these administration views. The variable ADA identi-
fies each legislator's prior voting record as conservative or liberal,
ranging between zero (most conservative) and 100 (most liberal).
If ideology played a role or logrolling along ideological lines oc-
curred, the variable ADA should capture this effect.
The primary focus of attention for the empirical work centered
on the role that the four major fishing interest groups played in in-
fluencing legislative voting. The four groups were the coastal, sal-
mon, tuna, and shrimp industries. The variables were constructed
by dividing the dollar value of that fish type landed in the legisla-
tor's state by the state's total personal income (both in 1975 dollars).
These variables give the relative economic importance of the var-
ious fish types to the state's economy. Other things equal, the larger
the relative importance of the group, the greater is the likelihood
that the legislator would support the group's position. Based on
prior theorizing, it was expected that the coastal and salmon vari-
ables would exert positive influences while the tuna and shrimp
variables would have negative effects on legislator support for
FCMA.
The state's per capita personal income was used as a control for
a variety of factors that may have affected the legislator's voting
position. For example, voter information and consumption levels
are undoubtedly related to income. These factors may, in turn, in-
fluence legislator voting.
Several additional variables were also entered into the analysis,
but because they were consistently insignificant and had no effect
on the other coefficient estimates they are not reported. These vari-148 Burton A. Abrams
ables included controls for the relative importance of other ma-
jor food groups (i.e., grains and meats) and other demographic
characteristics.^
Empirical Findings
Tables 1 and 2 present the empirical findings for the probit models
of legislator voting. Table 1 provides coefficient estimates for two
Table 1




























































































° Parentheses contain value of maximum likelihood estimate divided by the standard errors
of the coefficients. Vote in House: 209 for, 100 against. Vote in Senate: 76 for, 19 against
" Significant at the 5% level,

























































models applied to House and Senate votes on FCMA. Table 2
gives the estimated partial derivatives for the effect of the indepen-
dent variables upon the likelihood of legislator support. Model I
uses separate variables for each of the four major fishing interests.
Model II combines the coastal and salmon variables (i.e., the pro-
FCMA lobbies) and the shrimp and tuna variables (i.e., the anti-
FCMA lobbies) and omits per capita personal income.
Party affiliation proved to be statistically insignificant in all of
the models. Ideology—as proxied by the legislators' ADA ratings—
was usually insignificant. The House estimates indicated a tendency
for liberals (high ADA rating) to be less likely to support FCMA;
the variable ADA proved statistically significant only in the House's
Model II.
The fishing interests affected votes in the House as expected:
coastal and salmon catch exerted a positive influence on support
for FCMA, while shrimp and tuna catch had a negative effect. In
the Model I estimates for the House, the coastal and shrimp vari-
ables were significant at the 1 % level or better. While the tuna and
salmon variables proved to be insignificant at conventional levels,
they exhibited the expected signs.
When the fishing groups are aggregated along lobbying lines
(Model II), the aggregated variables are significant at the 1% levelBurton A. Abrams
or better. Based on the partial derivative estimates (Table 2), a
$1 increase in coastal or salmon catch (per million dollars in the
state's personal income) increased the probability that the represen-
tative supported FCMA by 0.28%; a $1 increase in shrimp or tuna
catch (per million dollars in a state's personal income) decreased
the probability that the representative supported FCMA by 0.22%.
This result indicates that on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the opposing
fishing groups exerted roughly equal but opposite influences (at the
mean).
The fairly robust influence of the fishing groups that was found
for the House was absent in the Senate. While the signs of the vari-
ables were broadly as expected, none of the fishing variables was
significant. This somewhat paradoxical division in the voting be-
havior of senators and representatives may perhaps be explained by
a hypothesis advanced by Amacher and Boyes (1978). Amacher and
Boyes support the view that the longer the period between elec-
tions, the more independently representatives will behave relative
to the desires of their state's polity. Hence, it should be expected
that the voting behavior by senators would be less predictable (on
average) than voting behavior in the House of Representatives.
The only explanatory variable that proved statistically signifi-
cant for the Senate was per-capita personal income. High-income
states had senators who were less likely to support FCMA. Since
per-capita income was being used to proxy a number of potential
demographic and other factors, interpreting this result is difficult.
Summary and Conclusions
The expansion of the regulated fishing zone from 12 to 200 miles
constituted a major change in institutional arrangement. This paper
has argued that on prior theoretic grounds, coastal and salmon
interests were expected to benefit while shrimp and tuna interests
were anticipated to lose.
The major fishing interests appear to have influenced legislators'
voting as expected in the House. Shrimp and tuna interests opposed
the legislation and were successful (statistically) in dissuading rep-
resentatives. Coastal and salmon interests exerted a positive and
statistically significant influence on legislator support. However,Expansion of Fishery Jurisdiction 151
the state-level economic strength of the fishing interests demon-
strated no significance in affecting senatorial voting. Perhaps sena-
tors are just more sensitive to national-level pressures than rep-
resentatives—or are more independent, as the Amacher-Boyes
(1978) hypothesis suggests.
Although the expansion of the fishing zone may have adversely
affected some types of fish groups, aggregate data on pounds har-
vested reveal a substantial increase in total catch following FCMA.
On balance, then, FCMA was likely to have been beneficial for the
U.S. fishing industry. Since the fishing industry was the dominant
participant in the lobbying activity over the legislation, it is not
surprising that the legislation passed once the objections ofthe tuna
and shrimp interests were overcome.
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Notes
1. The regulated zone had been extended from 3 miles to 12 miles
in 1966.
2. See, e.g.. Downs (1957), Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman
(1976), Abrams (1977), Silberman and Durden (1976), and Chappell,
Jr. (1982).
3. These included the percent of the populatioti aged 65 or older
and the percent of population who were Black.
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